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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Unfair Labor Practices
—Board Jurisdiction to Interpret the Contract.—NLRB v. C C Ply-
wood Corp. 1—Plywood, Lumber and Saw Mill Workers Local No. 2405, the
certified collective-bargaining representative of the production and main-
tenance employees of the C & C Plywood Corporation, entered into a collective
agreement with the company effective May 1, 1963. The agreement contained
a detailed classified wage scale and a provision (hereinafter referred to as
Article XVII) by which the employer reserved the right to "pay a premium
rate over and above the contractual classified wage rate to reward any partic-
ular employee for some special fitness, skill, aptitude, or the like." 2 The
agreement did not provide for arbitration of contract disputes.
Less than three weeks after the contract was signed, the employer
posted a notice that a premium pay plan would be put into effect for the
members of the "glue spreader" crews. Each of these crews was composed of
four men who received hourly wages of between $2.15 and $2.29 depending
upon the function performed within the crew. Under the premium pay plan
however, each member of the crew was to receive a uniform hourly wage of
$2.50 if the crew met specific bi-weekly production standards.
The union objected to the institution of this plan, contending that it
violated the terms of the agreement, which established the wage rates of each
crew member. When the company refused to rescind the plan, the union
filed unfair-labor-practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
The Board issued a complaint against the employer, alleging that the institu-
tion of the plan was a unilateral pay increase during the term of the agree-
ment, and thus violated the duties imposed by sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act. 3 In defense to the complaint, the employer
argued that since Article XVII expressly allowed it to institute a premium
wage rate the specific plan did not violate the act. 4 The Board, however, did
not agree with the employer. 5 It found that while the agreement did allow
for merit increases to particular employees, it did not authorize the company
to make the wages a function of the output of the crew as a whole.° Accord-
ingly, the Board ordered the company to cease and desist from the unfair
labor practice found, to rescind any plan unilaterally instituted, and, if
requested, to bargain with the union with respect to the institution of a
premium pay plan for the "glue spreader" crews.
The Board's petition to the Ninth Circuit for enforcement of the order
was denied? The court of appeals, unlike the Board, did not reach the
question of the meaning of Article XVII of the collective agreement. Instead,
it held that the Board did not have jurisdiction to find that the company had
violated section 8(a) of the act, since "the existence or non-existence of an
1 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
2 Id. at 422-23.
3 Section 8(a) (5) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . .
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. . . ." 61 Stat:
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)( 5 ) (1964).
4 Brief for Respondent, pp. 19-20.
5 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964).
6 Id. at 417.
7 351 F.2d 224 (9th Or. 1965). 	 •
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unfair practice charge [did] ... not turn entirely upon the provisions of the
Act, but arguably upon a good-faith dispute as to the correct meaning of the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement...." 8 The court pointed out
that the meaning to be attributed to Article XVII was a question not for the
Board, but for the courts under section 301 of the act"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the substantial
question of federal labor law raised by the Ninth Circuit's opinion. 10 HELD:
Reversed. In this case the Board had jurisdiction to construe the labor
agreement so far as was necessary to adjudicate the unfair labor practice.
The Court, however, made it clear that, since the collective-bargaining
agreement in this case did not provide for arbitration, its decision was limited
to the situation where only the Board and the courts were available as
forums to interpret the disputed contract provision." In reaching this
decision, the Supreme Court stated that "the legislative history of the Labor
Act, the precedent interpreting it, and the interest of its efficient administra-
tion . . . all lead to the conclusion that the Board had jurisdiction to deal
with the unfair labor practice charge in this case." 12
The Court's analysis of the legislative history of the National Labor
Relations Act was in response to an argument of respondent based on the
legislative history of the 1947 Senate Bill amending the act. 13 The original
amendment contained a provision [§ 8(a) (6)] 14 which would have given
the Board jurisdiction over all breaches of collective-bargaining agreements
by making such action an unfair labor practice. The respondent argued that
Congress, by deleting this provision from the bill, intended to preclude Board
jurisdiction whenever contract interpretation was involved 1 5
In rejecting this proposition, the Court noted that the provision was
deleted because it would have been a step toward government regulation of
the terms of labor agreements.16 The Court also pointed out that the legisla-
tive history indicated that "Congress was ... concerned with the possibility of
conflicting decisions that would result from placing all questions of contract
interpretation before both the Board and the courts."" The Court noted,
however, that in the instant case, the Board was adjudicating the union's
statutory rights under sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the act, subject matter
over which the courts did not have jurisdiction, and, thus, that this conflict
could not arise in the C & C Plywood type of situation.
Prior judicial determinations were used to reinforce the Court's position.
In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 113 for example, the employer was charged
8 Id. at 228.
0 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
10 384 U.S. 903 (1966).
11 385 U.S. at 426.
12 Id. at 430.
la S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
14 Proposed § 8(a) (6) stated: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer . . . to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or the terms of
an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration . ..."
15 Brief for Respondent, pp. 42-52.
16 385 U.S. at 427-28.
17 385 U.S. at 428 n.13.
18 350 U.S. 270 41956).
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with section 8(a) (1), (2), and (3) violations for his refusal to reinstate
strikers. In defense to the charges, the employer argued that the strikers had
violated the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining agreement, and
thus had lost their status as employees under the NLRA. The Board, in
evaluating the unfair-labor-practice charges, was forced to construe the no-
strike clause. It found that the clause referred only to economic strikers, not
unfair-labor-practice strikers and rejected the defense."' The Supreme Court
upheld this determination, stressing that the unfair-labor-practice question
turned on the proper interpretation of the no-strike clause in the contract.2°
If the Board were not allowed to construe the contract in a case such as
C & C Plywood where there is no compulsory-arbitration agreement between
the parties, "labor organizations would face inordinate delays in obtaining
vindication of their statutory rights," 2 ' since they could seek Board protection
only after a favorable disposition of the contract issue by the courts. As a
practical matter, Congress could not have intended to so limit the Board's
effectiveness.22 Finally, the Court summarily rejected the respondent's
alternative argument that even if the Board had jurisdiction, it had inter-
preted the contract erroneously. 23
The result reached by the Supreme Court is reasonable when one
considers the adverse effect that the opposite holding would have had upon
the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. The Court, however,
by no means exhausted all the arguments supporting its conclusion. For
example, under sections 8(a) (3),24 "union security," and 8(e), 26 "hot cargo,"
certain types of clauses are prohibited in collective-bargaining agreements.
In these instances, the Board must look at the particular clause involved in
order to apply the statute. Where the meaning of the clause has been in
dispute, the right of the Board to interpret it has been upheld. 2° Although
in these instances the clause is the affirmative basis of, rather than the defense
to, an unfair-labor-practice charge, the Board's role is essentially the same
—interpreting a contract in order to apply the statute.
Furthermore, Mastro Plastics does not stand alone as an example of
Supreme Court recognition of the Board's power to construe contract clauses
which are raised as a defense to an unfair-labor-practice charge. In NLRB v.
Lion Oil Co., 2T the majority of the Court construed a collective-bargaining
agreement as not impliedly including a no-strike clause. The opposite con-
struction would have provided the employer with a valid contractual defense
to the section 8(d) unfair-labor-practice charge. Two justices, however,
dissented in part. Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that it was not proper
10 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953).
20 350 U.S. at 279, 284.
21 385 U.S. at 429.
22 Id. at 430.
23 Id. at 430-31.
24 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 	 158(a)(3) (1964).
25 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 4 158(e) ( 1964).
26 As to 	 8(a) (3), see Red Star Express Lines v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 78 (2d Cir.
1952). As to 8(e), see Truck Drivers Union Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
27 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
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for the Court to make this determination in the first instance. 28 Mr. Justice
Harlan agreed with this contention and added that "the nature of the issue is
such that the Court of Appeals might well conclude that the issue should be
referred to the Board for its expert views in the first instance." 28 Neither
of the Justices who reached this issue even considered whether the proper
forum for interpreting the contract was a federal district court exercising
section 301 jurisdiction. In fact, Justice Harlan indicated that the Board was
the proper forum.
In addition, the Court's argument in C & C Plywood, regarding the
efficient administration of the act, could have been expanded. The Court's
primary concern was the delay which would be involved in obtaining a court
interpretation of the disputed contract clause. Here it could have pointed out
that if the courts were the only forum for interpreting collective-bargaining
agreements, a premium would be placed upon raising frivolous contractual
defenses to unfair-labor-practice charges. Thus, the delay could often arise
where there was not even a bona-fide dispute.
As the additional supporting precedent would indicate, the result in
C & C Plywood comes as no surprise. Yet, the reasoning by which the Court
reached its result presents certain problems. The Court first rejected respon-
dent's inference from the legislative history that Congress intended to pre-
clude Board jurisdiction over contract-interpretation disputes. Then, in one
step, the Court concluded that since the legislative history did not support
the respondent's inference and since the Board has jurisdiction over unfair-
labor-practice charges, the Board could also interpret the contract so far as
was necessary to adjudicate the unfair labor practice. The problem which
this reasoning presents is that the Court has clearly indicated that the C & C
Plywood opinion concerns only the relation between the Board and the courts.
Its reasoning, however, has a broader application. If the Board's jurisdiction
extends to all matters which are relevant to unfair-labor-practice adjudica-
tions, then it would not matter whether the contract contained an arbitration
clause, since the Board's singular jurisdiction over the unfair practice would
also give it jurisdiction over the relevant contract dispute. The fact that the
Court limited its decision to the situation where the collective-bargaining
agreement does not provide for arbitration, however, suggests that the Court
did not intend to go so far in this case. Perhaps it is more reasonable to say
that the Court could find no congressional intent contrary to the Board's
exercise of jurisdiction over the contract dispute, and because of prior judicial
precedent and the efficient administration of the act, it felt that, as be-
tween the Board and the courts, the Board was the proper forum. On the
other hand, the Court had reached its conclusion before it raised the judicial
precedent and policy arguments, thus adding support for a broad rather than
limited reading of the opinion.
An examination of the factors which would have been involved if the
labor contract had provided for arbitration of contract disputes will indicate
the importance of how the C & C Plywood decision is read. First, there is a
real danger of conflicting decisions between the Board and the arbitrator
28 Id. at 295.
29 Id. at 305.
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which is not present as between the Board and the courts. This conflict
arises when the arbitrator makes an award to settle a dispute which subse-
quently comes before the Board on unfair-labor-practice charges. Second, the
delay involved in obtaining a court interpretation is absent if there is an
arbitration procedure. Third, the act recognizes the importance of the arbi-
tration procedure as a means of preserving industrial peace. 3° Fourth, the
parties have selected the arbitration procedure as the forum for settling
their disputes.
Both the Board and the Supreme Court have previously considered the
relation between the Board and the arbitration procedure. In Speilberg Mfg.
Co.,31 the Board stated that if arbitration has occurred before a case reaches
the Board, the Board will not upset an arbitral award if the procedure was
fair, if the parties had agreed to be bound, and if the result was not repugnant
to the policies of the NLRA. The Court in Carey v. Westinghouse Corp.32
stated its approval of the Board's policy with regard to arbitration, but
emphasized that if the Board did have grounds to set aside the arbitral
award, its ruling would be superior. It is important to note, however, that
in both Speilberg and Carey the arbitral award, if made, would concern
subject matter over which the Board had an explicit congressional grant
of jurisdiction. Specifically, Speilberg involved an unfair labor practice, and
Carey involved a jurisdictional dispute.
Against this background, suppose the facts of C & C Plywood included
an arbitration clause. The dispute between the parties, rather than concerning
subject matter over which the Board has jurisdiction, would now require a
contract interpretation by the arbitrator (the meaning of Article XVII)
which would determine the outcome of the unfair-labor-practice charge. The
questions which this fact situation raise are whether the Board, after a
complaint has been filed, should defer to arbitration to interpret the contract,
and whether the Board must follow the arbitral award which is made. Under
the broad reading of C & C Plywood, which gives the Board jurisdiction
over all issues incident to unfair-labor-practice adjudications, the Board
would have jurisdiction to interpret the contract. Then, since the arbitral
award would involve subject matter over which the Board had jurisdic-
tion, Carey would give the Board the final word over the contract-interpre-
tation issue; but the Speilberg doctrine of Board deferral to arbitration
would still be viable. The narrow reading of C & C Plywood, however,
would still leave these questions open to be considered in light of the dif-
ferent factors involved when a forum is sought to interpret a collective-
bargaining agreement which contains an arbitration clause.
WILLIAM L. MAY, JR.
3° Section 203(d) states that "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment." 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
al 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
32 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (dictum).
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